The deployment of a large portion of the B-2 bomber fleet to Diego Garcia elevates this question.
Brinkmanship originated with Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who defined it in the statement, “The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art.” The fundamental requirement of successful application is a lack by the adversary of a detailed knowledge of the player’s limits. During the period of ideological conflict, when unalloyed mutual assured destruction was the bedrock of defense, this condition was available to each player.
The last effective player was the team of Nixon/Kissinger (with Nixon largely absent) against Brezhnev during the Yom Kippur War, after which MAD faded into new moral imperatives. The cautious Soviet leadership ushered in with Brezhnev chose to prioritize survival over ideology, abandoning the kind of challenge to the West that would have required the brinkmanship of elevated DEFCON.
No president has successfully practiced it since. The last noteworthy attempt was Trump vs. Kim Jong Un. No inference should be made that I think Trump could have succeeded. The ultimate judgment of whether Iran is a different case from North Korea is best left to the intelligence community. Open source offers some insight.
In comparison to North Korea, several problems have been solved or do not exist:
- Unlike production of plutonium by North Korea, Iran’s production of enriched uranium does not rely on nuclear reactors, reducing the hazard of a radiological disaster.
- Intelligence is much more abundant; Iran has been successfully penetrated on multiple occasions.
- See (Axios) Pro-Iranian account leaks alleged U.S. intel on Israel’s attack plans; Iran’s Superstrength Concrete. The problem of penetrating Iran’s deeply buried installations may have been solved by a breakthrough demonstrated against the Houthis.
A bunker buster consists of a very heavy case containing a relatively small amount of high explosive. Prior to the Houthi strikes, the mission for this type of ordinance was to destroy a target in one drop. But should the bomb make the penetration, it is disadvantaged by the small amount of explosive. The Houthi strikes demonstrate a remarkably reduced CEP, with the ability to drop a chain of munitions down one hole dug by multiple penetrators. This includes JDAMs with much larger explosive charges. The hammer becomes a drill, with much greater reach.
The classic goal of brinkmanship, for Iran to abandon their nuclear program, is not a likely outcome, since a strike cannot cost them more than a treaty. An outcome in Iran’s favor, a strike failure, remains possible. While Houthi rocket bases contain explosive accelerants that finish the job, centrifuge halls contain toxic but nonexplosive uranium hexafluoride.
The likelihood of a strike is enhanced by the perception of brinkmanship failure with North Korea. A similar time urgency applies.
It’s still a dice game.