There is a respectable, if sarcastically expressed, opinion that Israel created Hezbollah. This is not literally true — Iran did, but Israel’s involvement was essential. Please suspend your outrage while  I explain.

In the 70’s and 80’s, Lebanon was the main base of the PLO. The PLO, like the vast majority of Palestinians, is Sunni. This period of Lebanon’s history resembles the period of Cabinet Wars in Europe. The character of these wars :

• Aristocratic origin, with modern translation to “warlord.”
• Limited scope.
• Fought by mercenaries.
• Little involvement by the actual inhabitants.
• Varied impact on the inhabitants, from scarcely noticeable to massive collateral casualties, as in the 30 Years War.

In Lebanon, then as now, one might have no stake in  a conflict, yet pay with their life. So it was in the early 80’s. Lebanon’s Shiites now compose about half of the Muslim majority, but they were less numerous then. An underclass of predominantly Sunni Palestine, the largest block of contiguous Shiite territory is in the south, adjacent to Israel. At this time, Maronites had disproportionate representation in parliament, while actual power was slipping away to the PLO. Conflict in and around the massive refugee camps was fomented by numerous smaller groups, for whom the disenfranchised were sources of manpower — men with guns.

Maronite Phalangists, the PLO, and the smaller groups comprised the typical warlord mix. The PLO attacked Israel from this region. The Maronites sought to project power that was still institutionally theirs. The Shiites, isolated by religion from Gulf Arab support, remained mostly passive, until 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon.

The goal was to weaken the PLO and prop up the Maronites. The Israeli Army  fought in Shiite territory, where they remained active for some years. Heavy collateral damage resulted. The Shiites were not the target, but they suffered. This was Iran’s opening. What the Gulf Arabs would not give to Shiites, they would give. The training and organization was the best that the IRG , fresh from their own revolution, could provide.

Hezbollah is more than a geopolitical expression of Iran’s ambition. To Iran, home of hyperbolic Persian poetry, it is a candidate for spiritual myth, supporting the overarching  myth of Iran as a revolutionary theocracy, enshrined in Iran’s constitution, celebrated annually  with the great emotion, in heroic retelling of the martyrdom of Imam Ali.

Iran is also a country of institutionalized hypocrisy and extreme corruption. It is a developed nation, with a restive population, vulnerable infrastructure, and an extreme water shortage. The myth demands servicing, but the cost must be reasonable.

• Retaliation comes in two basic varieties, attributable to Iran, and deniable.
• The scope of attributable is limited by the cost of inevitable retaliation. As an example of the risks, Israel could easily destroy Kharg Island.
• Deniable has two forms, covert, where the forensics is hidden, and by proxy, where  the will to act can not be traced to Iran.
• The history of the subject shows that retaliation by proxy, which denies the victim easy justification in the international court of opinion, has the lowest risk.
• A low risk strategy is  to rebuild Hezbollah, supporting the myth of the revolutionary state while achieving deniable retaliation. It would re justify the IRG, a major source of corruption, to themselves, and to the  Iranian state. Never underestimate the need for self-justification.

Since 9/11, we have seen varying success in the reduction of terrorist organizations. Trans-national  Al-Qaeda has not regained its former prominence. ISIS maintains a weed-like vitality. Hamas, concentrated in a small geographic area, is under severe pressure, but may regenerate from indigenous support. Organizations with concentrated resources and low manpower have been successfully degraded. Organizations with a more  indigenous character, with more manpower than resources, have been resistant with the character of insurgency. The resurgence of ISIS in Iraq is an example.

In fractured Lebanon, Hezbollah began as a resistance movement, but in less than a decade assumed the character of a second government. Concentrated resources, with highly centralized command and control are the source of its singular reputation as the most powerful terror organization.  These aspects are most subject to degradation by concerted Israeli action.

Manpower, the indigenous connection of Hezbollah to ethnicity in Lebanon, is not so vulnerable. While Iran cannot, at least in the mid-term, reconstitute Hezbollah with all the power of a second government, it can support a lightweight, manpower based group well prepared for guerrilla action with occasional heavy weapons in the mix.

A prolonged ground action by Israel would come to resemble counter-insurgency. This event forced Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.

The leaders and  senior politicians of Israel have all lived through  the unsuccessful attempt to influence Lebanon’s trajectory, to deny terror a sanctuary in Lebanon by skilled military intervention. Despite calls to “finish off Hezbollah”, their inner thoughts must span a range, from doubt of the achievable to realistic buying of time, time of relative security. When the enemy has 200,000 missiles, you have to do something.

Perhaps time is all you can buy in the Eternal City._*

*Jerusalem is older than Rome.