Reuters: Chinese state media cheer Xi-Trump meeting, say confrontation not inevitable. This was preceded by (Washington Post)Tillerson’s visit to Beijing, which the Post summarizes as a win for China. The Post notes  the remarkable pivot, from a campaign that demonized China and made a saint of Russia, to the polar opposite. In the old days, of which too much lingers in vocabulary, this would have been explained as “balance of power politics.” Today is radically different, because the real dangers come from tiny-to-small actors, state and non-state.

Ten years from now, it may be different again. China is much more adroit in the use of soft power than the U.S. The Trump administration seems blind to this: (Reuters) U.S. backs out of Latam development fund in sign of policy shift. In twenty years, it is likely that the railroads, airports, and mining concessions in South America will be controlled by China’s state capitalism.  When they have built the Nicaragua canal, South America will have passed to China’s sphere of influence. Since China has larger population and lower labor costs than the U.S.,  it would require U.S. strategists of extraordinary talent and insight to avert this.

But the current problem is with tiny actors. In Donald Trump’s Internal Conflicts, I wrote

… This short note offers the possibility, not probability, that Trump’s points of view will evolve in unexpected directions. It takes note of unexpected diversity in Trump’s selection of his inner circle and unusual expressions of thought…

…It is possible that Trump is changeable. By implication of the above, he may be the kind of person who will recognize, perhaps not immediately, that eradication of our liberal heritage will result in a one term presidency.

This was demonstrated first with foreign affairs, and more lately, with an expressed desire to cooperate with the Democrats.  In real estate all achievements are measured by the most fungible of commodities: money. (Classic examples of fungible commodities are oil, gas, grain, and pork bellies.) Except for the occasional problem of exchange controls, all money is equivalent. One tends to extend the familiar. So Trump may be the first president for whom achievement is fungible. If you can’t solve one problem (Russia), why not another?

Both pivots are the results of  extraordinary challenges. It appears that Trump’s initially naive attitudes towards Russia, and his overconfidence in his ability to judge people gave him a bad case of the leeches. There is the distinct possibility that, completely unknown to Trump, some of his campaign associates were accessories, though not spies themselves, to espionage against the U.S.

In fairness, people confidence in business means trying them out and if necessary, saying, “You’re fired.” The ship of state can’t be managed that way.  But only by turning away from Russia, by embracing the internationalist attitudes of the West, can Trump insulate himself from guilt by association.

Gone with the idea of rapprochement with Russia are the ideas floated in 2017 Predictions; Trump’s U.S./Russia Codominium/ New-New World Order. Excerpting,

• Deliberate exclusion of China from the codominium. As with a bad marriage, there will be attempt to blame the other partner. Subtle provocations will continue, with the motive to induce Chinese retaliation, providing further pretexts. But China will stick to soft power unless pushed to the wall.
• Promotion of economic interdependence between the U.S. and Russia.

and

• The Eurasian codominium warned of by Kissinger is averted.
• A profitable mercantile model with Russia is established.

Trump’s approach to China now reverts to the internationalist model. Without Russia as the favored natural resources state, it’s impossible to construct a self-sufficient codominium.

Since Trump’s concept of achievements is that they are fungible, he reconsiders the South China Sea.  There are things you want to keep, and things you want to trade. It’s key to streamlining a business.

Maybe it’s trading material. I’ll finish this a little later.

This is offered since it is known that Russia is interested in the opinions of independent analysts.

The posture of the Russian government after the U.S. missile strike on Shayrat Airfield is expected. It’s what is called  “boilerplate”, the repetitive material of a document that so closely follows form as to have no information content. At least, we hope that is all it is.

The Laws of War have been violated in Syria to the tune of 500,000 dead. To Bashar Assad, the arithmetic of a little sarin, of perhaps 80 more dead, is too small to matter. Perhaps it was inevitable that the choices of the West to ignore the the conduct of the Chechen wars, of the previous U.S. administration to ignore violation of the “red line”, and Rex Tillerson’s misstep, would encourage Russia to vigorously shield and possibly abet Assad’s actions.

We gave you a special pass on the Chechen wars. We knew your survival was at stake. Syria is too distant for that.

We have our Syrian frenemies, you have Assad, and the Syrian people have nothing. We are bound together by our common enemy, jihadism. What separates us, which is why you are interested in notes such as ours, is the degree to which we balance military advantage against the preservation of civilian lives. You have your calculus, and we have ours.

Our idea is that deterrence of chemical weapons use saves a meaningful fraction of lives in the Syria conflict. What’s a few thousand of 500,000? To us, it’s a lot.

There is danger to Russia in complicity with Assad. If it becomes viral in the Islamic populations of Russia and Central Asia that Russia is complicit in gas attacks, it could boomerang on Russia. This could easily happen, even if by your own standards, your hands are clean. Standards of personal hygiene vary widely.

Such a viral idea could not be controlled even by state media. In your justified fear of the potential for jihadism in Russia, do not make your problems worse by creation of a viral myth.

Reuters Syria Conflict blog: Syrian foreign minister says first air strike by Syrian army on Khan Skeikhoun on Tuesday was at 11:30am and targeted arms depot belonging to Nusra Front.

When an arms depot is bombed, there are inevitably secondary explosions of the high explosive munitions.  This produces what is known as a “fireworks display”, as the munitions cook off and launch randomly into the sky and surrounding neighborhoods. Advanced militaries design their depots to limit this, sectioned  by earthen berms to stop the spread.  In this case, the “depot” was a shack. In Russia denies Assad to blame for chemical attack, a 14 year old girl describes her experience of being less than 100 feet from the shack when the bomb hit it. Requoting the NY Times,

“…she saw an aircraft drop a bomb on a one-story building a few dozen yards away. In a telephone interview Tuesday night, she described an explosion like a yellow mushroom cloud that stung her eyes. “It was like a winter fog,” she said.”

A bomb hit the shack, and the only thing that exploded was the bomb itself? Without enough force to knock her off her feet or even dust her up a bit? She remarks on the effect to her eyes. The implausible coincidences:

• The Assad regime identifies the shack as an arms depot.
• The arms depot contains no conventional munitions.
• It just happens to contain chemical weapons.
• The bomb that hit exploded with weak force, as expected of a nerve agent munition.
• The victims exhibit symptoms of nerve agent exposure.
• There has been no evidence that Al Nusra has sarin.
• Contradicting  practical knowledge, the Assad regime implicitly claims that the bomb succeeds in mixing Al Nusra’s presumed sarin precursors instead of dispersing them.

Dear reader, please excuse the repetition. Sometimes, it makes a difference.

Reuters: Russia denies Assad to blame for chemical attack, on course for collision with Trump. Quoting,

Washington said it believed the deaths were caused by sarin nerve gas dropped by Syrian aircraft. But Moscow offered an alternative explanation that would shield Assad: that the poison gas belonged to rebels and had leaked from an insurgent weapons depot hit by Syrian bombs.

A previous assertion that rebel elements used sarin is Seymour Hersh’s piece, (LRB) Whose Sarin?, about the August 2013 incident near Damascus.  It shows the power of good writing. But it was completely refuted by the U.N. trajectory study cited by the (BBC) in Syria chemical attack: What we know. Quoting from (pdf, undocs.org) “Identical letters dated 13 December 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council”, document # A/68/663–S/2013/735,

8. In a letter dated 14 June 2013, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations reported to the Secretary-General, inter alia, its updated assessment alleging that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had used the chemical warfare agent Sarin in an attack on the Aleppo suburb of Khan Al Asal on 19 March 2013.

But the difficulties are  simplified for production of binary sarin, which is stored in a bomb or projectile as two chemicals that mix when the bomb is released or the projectile is fired. It is  possible that ISIS could operate a binary production facility. What would happen if the facility were hit by a bomb?

Mixing of the two precursors must be done thoroughly and quickly, or the production of sarin is low. A hit on a factory  would cause most of the contents to separate, rather than combine. Dispersion would be slow and wind driven. Nevertheless, if tons of a sarin precursor chemical, methylphosphonic acid dichloride, was stored on site and dispersed, fatalities could have resulted.

But most significantly, (NY Times) Worst Chemical Attack in Years in Syria; U.S. Blames Assad quotes witness Mariam Abu Khalil, who was extremely close to the impact:

“…she saw an aircraft drop a bomb on a one-story building a few dozen yards away. In a telephone interview Tuesday night, she described an explosion like a yellow mushroom cloud that stung her eyes. “It was like a winter fog,” she said.”

Her recounting does not describe a blast effect, the shock to the body from proximity to an explosion. The absence is specific to a chemical munition. This, and prior use of sarin by the Assad regime, effectively refute the Russian argument.

Reuters: Russian minister: 10 dead in St. Petersburg metro blast – Interfax. A sequence of questions results:

• Is this terrorism? The probability is high, but the question is necessary.  No decent government wants to exacerbate tensions because of the actions of the purely deranged.
• Is it related to the Caucasus? If it is terrorism, the probability is high.
• Are some of the actors Chechen? It gets interesting. As a whole the southern Caucasus contains elements that can be radicalized, but Chechnya is the radical state.
• If they are Chechen, are they disloyal to Ramzan Kadyrov, the personal dictator of Chechnya?

These are obvious questions. A more interesting one looms. In 2005, it became obvious that Putin had neutralized the threat of Chechnya by giving it a special deal. To do this, he had to find someone to deal with who could reciprocate in these ways:

• Personally guarantee that there would not be a Third Chechen War.
• Offer services to aid in control of the radical potential of the Caucasus as a whole. Co-opting of radical elements, and counterintelligence.

The extreme of this is that Kadyrov’s Chechnya is allowed strict Sharia law, and (Atlantic) personal dictatorship with impunity. Perhaps this would not have been required simply to end the Chechen wars. But it serves another function; it is an attractant to individuals who would otherwise fall into the jihadist orbit. That it has not been completely successful shows in the large numbers of Chechen members of ISIS. But it could have been worse. The more orthodox Chechnya is, the more resources are available to counterintelligence: informants, operatives, sympathies.

If the above questions are affirmed, Kadyrov’s co-opting has failed Putin twice: in the death of Boris Nemtsov, where close associates of Kadyrov were implicated, and in these metro bombings. The successes, prevention of repetitions of the 1999 apartment bombings, are of course not known. The Russians do not feel quite the obligation of due process for terrorists as in the West.

To neutralize at least some of the perpetrators of the Nemtsov assassination, Russia mounted a police/paramilitary raid into Chechnya with assets from neighboring oblasts. Kadyrov made a statement  that sounded like (WSJ) an open rebellion against the Kremlin, which (RFE)  publicly rebuked him. An RFE article,  The Warlord Checkmates The Tsar, offers a variety of opinions  on the degree to which Putin uses Kadyrov and in turn is manipulated by him.

Some of the ideas tend towards conspiracy, failing Occam’s Razor. The current relationship can be most easily explained as toleration of an ethnic attractant to co-opt Islamic extremism, blunt, and absorb it. It hasn’t been absorbed at all, but perhaps Putin’s solution should be measured by how much worse things could be.

The Chechnya bargain cannot be undone without a third war. Instead, Russia’s response is to strengthen her internal defenses. The merger of the SVR and the FSB security services into a Ministry of State Security will enable a complete internal judicial process, including liquidation, hidden from the public.

This new Russian police-state will facilitate the take-down of widespread terrorist networks, because the target networks will not realize what is happening to them. It’s a terrible thing, to abolish civil liberties, to bring back the troika, because Russia contains a hostile, literally murderous enclave.

But Putin would ask, and this deserves to be part of his Apology: Would you rather have a Third Chechen War?

Reuters:  U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis says Iran continues to sponsor terrorism. Quoting,

“At the time when I spoke about Iran I was a commander of US central command and that (Iran) was the primary exporter of terrorism, frankly, it was the primary state sponsor of terrorism and it continues that kind of behavior today,”

Some hold opinions that Mattis, along with the Marine Corps as a whole, hold a grudge against Iran.  In 2012, Mattis famously said that the three greatest threats to U.S. security were Iran X3. Quoting the Washington Post,

Soon after Mattis was tapped to lead U.S. forces in the Middle East in August 2010, Obama asked the general to spell out his top priorities. Mattis replied that he had three: “Number one Iran. Number two Iran. Number three Iran,” said a senior U.S. official who was present. The general’s singular focus unnerved some civilian leaders, who thought he should pay attention to a broader range of threats.

 I agree with all but the choice of words. Iran is in an expansionist, revolutionary phase, not unlike the early years of the Soviet Union. Unlike any other state adversary extant, it also exports an ideology, with the gleam of the caliphate, something we were hoping would not recur since the downfall of communism.

Along with many disparate groups, Iran incubated and fueled the Iraq insurgency  that followed  the war. It quickly destroyed hopes for a pluralistic democracy in Iraq. The troops under the command of Mattis suffered terribly. Like the best of commanders, Mattis felt every death a personal loss.

The insurgency will resume after ISIS is vanquished. It’s part of the pathos of history, of Napoleon, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao, Hitler, Saddam Hussein, et al. that the theocracy of Iran believe in the lie of their own special destiny. But is it state sponsored terrorism? In Vietnam, the tactics of a very similar insurgency were branded “asymmetric warfare.”

Saudi Foreign Minister Al-Jubeir’s thunderbolt response silences Iran summarizes Iranian actions abroad, attacks on embassies, on the Khobar Towers bombing, etc. He refers to  Iran’s assassinations program, which was very active until the mid 90’s:

Al-Jubeir added: “Iranian agents have links with terrorist attacks in Europe and South America. We did not create these facts. This is the world and this is the proof. We wish that Iran would become a great neighbor. But this depends on both sides. If you want the world to deal with you, then there is a requirement of giving up hostile expansionist policies and return to international norms and practices.”

There have been some pretty complicated intellectual efforts to integrate the word “terrorism” into the continuum of warfare. But a very simple distinction works as well. The word “terrorism” could be inclusive of directed or spontaneous acts that have no strategy behind them other than demoralization of a population — but not much more.

While the 9/11 attacks had some attributes of a decapitation strike, I cannot recall any subsequent incidents of terror, at least in the west, with hints of military strategy.  Al-Jubeir asserts that 2003 terror attacks in Riyadh, claimed by Al Qaeda, implicate Iran. Perhaps they do. The 1998 embassy bombings, claimed by Al Qaeda, were (Washington Post) facilitated by Iran.

Iran is implicated in embassy attacks, assassinations,  use of proxies against American forces, and subversion of neighboring states. But except for the 2003 Riyadh bombings, the special character of the word “terror” is unnecessarily diluted by application to Iran. Perhaps Mattis felt obliged to use the most impactful word. We don’t have a special one for a theocratic state with designs on the entire Middle East.

But what of Saudi Arabia? In (Reuters) Iran rejects U.S. terror claim by Mattis, blames Saudi, foreign ministry spokesman Bahram Ghasemi is quoted:

“Some countries led by America are determined to ignore the main source of Takfiri-Wahhabi terrorism and extremism,” foreign ministry spokesman Bahram Ghasemi was quoted by Iran’s state news agency IRNA as saying.

All monarchies are not the same. While King Salman is supposedly an absolute monarch, Saudi Arabia is more pluralistic than an organizational chart would show. At one time, it was asserted that the House of Saud governs with the assent of the ulama, and that the ulama could cause it to fall. The ulama might be weakening a little, while uptake of western culture broadens. It is still a tribal society, but it’s…slowly…melting.

Saudi Arabia does not officially tolerate terrorism. But there are many wealthy people, who are very astute in moving their money around, even in the presence of official controls. Don’t have a bank handy? We’ll start one. Need an investment vehicle that bypasses exchange controls? No problem. Moving and disguising wealth are almost common skills. Before  achieving cultural modernity, Saudi Arabia became business-multinational.

 Some of the plutocrats involved have blatantly western lifestyles. Out of country, some indulge those carnal pleasures such as can be bought with outré sums. Yet they feel the tug of conscience. They seek to make it right, as once in the west, indulgences were purchased. The expression, understandable by those who know, is “I like to give.” To what is left mysteriously indefinite.

There is no way for the U.S. to stop it. Sanctions would be useless. To change the character of a country requires generations. The House of Saud is in the midst of the attempt to reform Saudi society to at least remove the religious barriers to industrialization. Only after approximations of western attitudes are accepted by the core of Saudi society will there even be the possibility of reform of the ulama itself. And of the Wahhabi madrassa system, which is funded on a more open level.

When that occurs, one of the great “heat engines” of terrorism will finally grind to a halt.