By 2004, Iran had developed a detailed, complete, sophisticated design for an implosion weapon at an installation in Parchin. See (NPEC) Lessons from China: How Soon Could Iran Get the Bomb? The design closely follows early Chinese weapons, suggesting proliferation sources other than Russia. The design underwent “cold testing”, with dummy non-fissionable pits, with translation to a functional device enabled by knowledge and technique also subject to proliferation. Virtually all of the obstacles asserted to challenge Iran’s final steps were addressed by 2004.
Those who have advocated restraint prioritize the apparent reluctance of Khameini to approve the final steps of the program. Those who prioritize the existence of the design, and possibly bombs sans fissionable pits, note that if 90% uranium 235 were available, the bomb could be assembled almost instantaneously on the advent of the political decision. An untested bomb might not work, or it might fizzle, but the closely similar Chinese design worked the first time, as did the American Fat Man design. The Iranian implosion weapon is likely to work without testing.
An implosion bomb requires 90% uranium because it relies on compressing the pit to a fraction of its volume. The critical mass of uranium or plutonium is roughly inversely proportional to the square of the density. When the pit is compressed, the density goes up, the pit becomes super-critical, and the chain reaction of fission proceeds for a few microseconds until the pit flies apart.
Uranium is a strong metal. Imagine compressing the steel in an I-beam to half the original thickness. This does not occur in the world we know. In an implosion weapon, this is accomplished with very powerful and precise conventional explosives surrounding the pit, generating a spherical shock wave that converges on the pit with accuracy better than a microsecond. The precision required is so great that some method of focusing the shock waves is required. Here the Iranian weapon follows a Chinese innovation.
If the timing fails, the bomb fails. This is why implosion weapons are hard to build. With 60% uranium, the greater compression required to compensate for the reduced concentration of active material is impractical or extremely challenging.
Post-strike assessments have not determined whether the infrastructure required to enrich from 60% to 90% has been disrupted. We continue with the assumption that it has. What is the weapon potential of the 60% stock, if, as some think, it is hidden in the tunnels of Isfahan?
The first atomic bomb dropped on Japan, Little Boy, was not an implosion design. It was so inefficient and dangerous that only one was ever built. The design is so simple, it was used without testing. It is simple because it does not rely on implosion at all. It was built around a surplus artillery barrel. At one end is a fixed spike made of 80% uranium-235. At the other end is the projectile, a cylindrical doughnut also made of uranium-235, which is fired at the spike by several bags of smokeless powder of the kind used in naval guns. When the spike fills the hole in the doughnut, super-criticality occurs. Even if the gunpowder ignites accidentally, there will be a nuclear explosion. This is what makes it so unsafe; a damaged gun-type weapon can still function, while an implosion weapon would likely fail.
The gun-type weapon is too heavy to fit on a missile, but it can fit in a dhow, shipping container, or cargo aircraft. There are some circumstances in which it might be used in the Gulf against American interests without risk of massive retaliation, such as the sinking of an aircraft carrier. Compared to plutonium weapons, uranium emits practically no radiation, making it undetectable by purely passive means, such as a Geiger counter. Active probes and close inspection are required to protect port facilities.
Of interest is how many gun-type weapons could be manufactured from Iran’s stockpile of 60% uranium. The IAEA states that Iran has a minimum of 408 kg. The original Little Boy was constructed from 80% uranium-235, and contained two critical masses. To achieve two critical masses with 60% uranium-235, more must be used.
The actual amount of 60% uranium-235 required for two critical masses is not available to open source. A napkin calculation has been performed. The short answer is that the amount of uranium must be doubled. Three gun-type weapons can be constructed from the IAEA stockpile estimate. If enrichment resumes, the metal can easily be reclaimed and converted to uranium hexaflouride.
The napkin calc is not complicated. It piggy-backs on public knowledge about Little Boy, critical masses for various enrichment levels, and the relationship between criticality and density. There is a mathematical trick. Since it is “techies-only”, it will be presented in a following post.